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Upholding a 40-Year-Old Promise: 
Why the Texas Sonogram Act is 
Unlawful According to Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey 
 
Vicki Toscano* and Elizabeth Reiter** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since 2003, a woman seeking an abortion in Texas must 
undergo one additional medical procedure at least 24 hours 
prior to receiving an abortion in order for the woman’s consent 
to an abortion to be considered “voluntary and informed” under 
the law.1 Although this medical procedure may not be deemed 
medically necessary by physicians, the state has declared it 
necessary for all women seeking an abortion.2 In the early 
stages of pregnancy, this procedure often requires the insertion 
of a large probe into the vagina of the pregnant woman, even 
against her will.3 
 
* Vicki Toscano is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Nova 
Southeastern University. She obtained her J.D. at SUNY at Buffalo School of 
Law (1999) and received her Ph.D. in Philosophy at SUNY at Buffalo (2002). 
** Elizabeth Reiter, J.D. (SUNY at Buffalo School of Law, 1999) is an 
attorney at Guttman & Wallace in Ithaca, New York. She has also worked at 
the New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department and Alston & 
Bird, LLP. 
1. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013). The law 
does contain exceptions to the 24-hour requirement in the event that there is 
a medical emergency requiring an immediate abortion or if the pregnant 
woman certifies that she lives more than 100 miles away from the nearest 
abortion provider. Id. §§ 171.012(4), 171.0124. 
2. Id. § 171.011. An abortion can only be performed with the woman’s 
voluntary and informed consent. Id. 
3. In early pregnancy, transvaginal ultrasounds may be needed to create 
a clear image and over 85% of pregnancies are aborted in the first trimester. 
See In Brief: Fact Sheet: Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, 
GUTTMACHER INST., 1-2 (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html [hereinafter 
Induced Abortion]. 
1
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The medical procedure is a sonogram, done for the 
purposes of viewing the fetus. Texas is not alone in requiring 
sonograms prior to abortion—as of January 2014, at least 
seven other states require non-medically necessary sonograms 
prior to abortion.4 In addition to the states that require women 
to receive sonograms prior to having an abortion, at least nine 
other states require that if a sonogram is to be performed as 
part of the preparation for abortion, then the pregnant woman 
must be offered the opportunity to view the sonogram images.5 
Five other states require that women be offered the 
opportunity by their provider to have a sonogram before 
abortion.6 
However, Texas has taken this requirement a step further. 
Now, as women may be forcibly probed, they will also have a 
screen displaying the sonogram images pointed toward their 
face (although they may shut their eyes or turn their heads 
away) and the fetal heartbeat, if one can be heard, will be 
played for them.7 Meanwhile, state law mandates that the 
physician describe the sonogram images to the pregnant 
woman, including the dimensions of the fetus, the existence of 
cardiac activity, and the existence of external members and 
internal organs.8 Three other states have passed sonogram 
laws similar to the one in Texas.9 
This scenario brings to mind the iconic scene from “A 
 
4. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER 
INST. 1-2 (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf [hereinafter 
Requirements for Ultrasound]. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal 
Pain, Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 347 & 
n.59 (2011). 
8. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012, 171.0122 (West 
2013). Unless they fit into a qualified exception: victims of sexual assault, 
minors using the judicial bypass option, or if the fetus has been diagnosed 
with a medical condition or abnormality. Id. § 171.0122. 
9. Courts have blocked these sonogram regulations from going into effect 
in North Carolina (Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011)) and 
Oklahoma (Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010)). As of 
March 2014, Louisiana’s law was still in effect. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.35.2(C)-(D) (2013). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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Clockwork Orange,” in which a prisoner has his eyes forcibly 
pinned open so he may be forced to watch videos that have 
been deemed useful in modifying his criminal behavior.10 
Although the state of Texas has not mandated that women’s 
eyes be pinned open in order to view the sonogram images, the 
justification for forcing women to receive a sonogram, be shown 
the viewing screen, and be presented with a description thereof 
is the same as that given in “A Clockwork Orange”—it is for 
the good of the patient.11 
The Texas Sonogram Act12 was initially blocked by a 
district court, which found that it violated the First 
Amendment rights of physicians.13 Nonetheless, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled this decision and 
determined that this new requirement does not violate either 
the First Amendment rights of physicians or women’s 
constitutional rights to reproductive decision-making.14 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a woman’s right 
to have an abortion as a fundamental right when it decided Roe 
v. Wade15 40 years ago, the Court has decided a number of 
cases since that time, which have impacted both the right of 
women to obtain an abortion and the ability of states to 
regulate abortion. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,16 the Supreme Court upheld certain 
state abortion regulations that purported to advance the 
informed consent of the pregnant woman.17 Today, it is unclear 
 
10. See generally A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner Bros. 1971). 
11. Id. 
12. Texas passed an Act “relating to informed consent to abortion,” in 
which the main portion of the law requires the performance of a sonogram. 
2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 73 (West) (codified as amended at TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.002, 171.012, 171.0121-171.0124, 171.013, 
171.015, 241.007, 243.017, 245.006, 245.024 & TEX. OCC. §§ 164.055, 
164.0551 (West 2013)). References to the Texas Sonogram Act are to TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013). 
13. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 947-48 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
14. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
17. Id. at 882-883. 
3
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which regulations states may impose constitutionally on 
abortion with the supposed purpose of enhancing women’s 
informed consent. The most recent and revealing Supreme 
Court case, Gonzales v. Carhart,18 went so far as to allow a 
complete ban on one type of abortion procedure, for the 
supposed purpose of protecting women’s informed consent.19 
Further confusion lies in the claim made in Casey that 
state abortion regulations for the purpose of protecting fetal life 
may be constitutional even prior to viability.20 That case 
presented twin goals of protecting potential life and enhancing 
women’s autonomy as co-existent.21 Gonzales v. Carhart, 
however, upheld a statute that clearly limits women’s 
autonomy by proscribing partial-birth abortion, regardless of 
any determinations of the patient and her physician regarding 
the patient’s medical needs.22 Although the Court tried to 
relate the ban on partial-birth abortion to enhancing the 
informed consent of pregnant women seeking an abortion, the 
majority opinion identified two purposes of the ban: to send a 
message about the value of fetal life and to regulate medical 
ethics.23 
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Casey and Gonzales have 
led to a massive number of new regulations regarding abortion 
in recent years.24 Aside from new sonogram requirements, 
many states now require disclosures regarding the possibility 
of the fetus feeling pain as early as twenty weeks and the 
purported associations between abortion and increased risks of 
suicide, breast cancer, infertility, and negative emotional 
health.25 The link between these regulations and the goals of 
 
18. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
19. Id. 
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83. 
21. Id. at 833. 
22. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133. 
23. Id. at 157. 
24. See News in Context: More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted 
in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire Previous Decade, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 
2014), 
https://guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/print/2014/01/02/index.html 
(noting that North Dakota, Texas, Arkansas, and North Carolina were “key 
to th[e] increase” in 2013. 
25. See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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protecting potential life and enhancing informed consent are 
unclear. Many of these claims are scientifically dubious,26 and 
it is unlikely that any of them will significantly affect a 
woman’s choice to abort, as this is driven by many non-
negotiable and powerful factors.27 
The Supreme Court has yet to review this new generation 
of regulations on abortion, but such review is both timely and 
necessary. The extent to which these regulations have invaded 
women’s bodily integrity, have violated women’s dignity, and 
have moved from persuasion to manipulation in an attempt to 
protect potential life is unprecedented. It is necessary that we 
return to the constitutional “undue burden” test adopted in 
Casey28 in order to reassess what limitations that opinion is 
best understood as creating with regard to these state 
 
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
111, 140-51 (2008); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How 
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 13-26 (2012). See also Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, 
State Abortion Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of 
Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 6-13 (2007). 
26. See, e.g., Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of 
Pregnancy Termination on Future Reproduction, 4 BALLIERE’S CLINICAL 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 391, 391-92 (1990); Gold & Nash, supra note 25, 
at 6-13 (determining that, of the 23 states studied that mandate information 
be provided to women seeking abortions, many mandate the provision of 
information that not only violates the tenets of informed consent, but is 
scientifically inaccurate); Katherine DeLellis Henderson et al., Incomplete 
Pregnancy is not Associated with Breast Cancer Risk: The California Teachers 
Study, 77 CONTRACEPTION 391 (2008) (study concludes that there is “no 
relationship between incomplete pregnancy and breast cancer risk.”); Trine 
Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental 
Disorder, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 332 (2011) (finding no association 
between abortion and likelihood of contact with psychiatric services for 
mental disorder); Tobin, supra note 25, at 143-48 (regarding claims of fetal 
pain during early stages of pregnancy). 
27. See Induced Abortion, supra note 3 (“The reasons women give for 
having an abortion underscore their understanding of the responsibilities of 
parenthood and family life. Three-fourths of women cite concern for or 
responsibility to other individuals; three-fourths say they cannot afford a 
child; three-fourths say that having a baby would interfere with work, school 
or the ability to care for dependents; and half say they do not want to be a 
single parent or are having problems with their husband or partner.”) 
(footnote omitted). Additionally commentators have noted that women 
historically have been willing to face high levels of medical risk to obtain 
abortions. See Tobin, supra note 25, at 125. 
28. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992). 
5
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regulations on abortion. Through the years many theorists and 
Courts have attempted to interpret the undue burden test in 
Casey.29 Many of these interpretations have overlooked the 
requirement that women’s decision-making processes must be 
free from manipulation and coercion, and thus have 
misunderstood the balance struck in Casey. To truly advance 
the twin goals being discussed in Casey—protection of potential 
life and enhancing women’s informed consent—courts must 
recognize that state abortion regulations that interfere with a 
woman’s decision-making liberty in an attempt to protect 
potential life impose an undue burden on a women’s right to 
choose an abortion. 
Additionally, some theorists have recently attempted to 
apply the standards created in Casey to the Texas Sonogram 
Act, or laws like it, to determine whether such laws are 
constitutional.30 In so doing, however, parts of their analyses 
were limited by a rather restrictive understanding of what is 
rightfully said to create an undue burden and what is rightfully 
said to be misleading information. By applying a different 
 
29. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion 
Rights after Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 682-89 (2004); 
Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion 
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223, 242-63 (2009); Jeffrey 
A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-
Process Anti-Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to 
the “Undue Burden” Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control 
Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 211, 243 (2001); Linda J. 
Wharton, et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323-385 (2006) 
(discussing various cases); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1980 1985-91 (2002); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey 
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1994); Kaitlyn 
Moredock, Note, “Ensuring so Grave a Choice is Well Informed”: The Use of 
Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State Interests in Unborn Life, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973 (2010). 
30. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 349-57 (2011); Tobin, supra note 25, 
at 140-51; Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 13-33; Robert M. Godzeno, Note, 
The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed Consent Legislation Post-
Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 303-21 (2009); Jeffrey 
Roseberry, Undue Burden and the Law of Abortion in Arizona, 44 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 391, 397-418 (2012); Sarah E. Weber, Comment, An Attempt to Legislate 
Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion 
Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 364-81 (2009). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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interpretation of the undue burden standard in Casey, one that 
best represents the balance that the Supreme Court created in 
Casey, we conclude that the Texas Sonogram Act and all other 
laws like it constitute an unconstitutional infringement on 
women’s due process rights with respect to abortion.31 
This Article begins with a brief review in Part II of the 
three crucial Supreme Court cases on abortion rights: Roe v. 
Wade,32 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,33 and Gonzalez v. Carhart.34 Based on these cases, Part 
III formulates a constitutional test that courts should be using 
to determine whether an abortion regulation is constitutional 
that includes all of the factors identified by the Supreme Court 
as part of the “undue burden” analysis, factors that have been 
overlooked by many courts. Finally, Part IV applies this 
constitutional test to the Texas Sonogram Act, concluding that 
the act is unconstitutional because it: (1) requires the delivery 
of misleading, untruthful and irrelevant information; (2) 
unconstitutionally hinders women’s decision-making liberty; 
and (3) poses a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of the 
relevant group of women affected by the regulation. 
 
II. The Evolution of Abortion Law 
 
In order to analyze the legal implications of the Texas 
Sonogram Act, we must first understand three benchmark U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that establish the current legal landscape 
regarding state abortion regulations: Roe v. Wade,35 Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,36 and 
 
31. This is not to suggest that there are not also other independent 
constitutional grounds that may support finding these forced sonogram laws 
unconstitutional. Physicians’ first amendment rights, for example, are also 
obviously implicated. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A 
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 939, 959 (2007); Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and 
Say ‘Ideology’: Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
155, 155 (2009). 
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
34. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
36. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
7
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Gonzales v. Carhart.37 Taken together, these cases explain why 
a requirement that forces a woman to undergo a sonogram, 
potentially transvaginal, and to listen to a medical description 
of the fetus with no medical necessity could appear to be legally 
justified despite its unconstitutional intrusion upon a woman’s 
right to privacy. 
 
A. Roe v. Wade38 
 
Decided in 1973, the Roe decision is based upon the notion 
of an individual’s fundamental right to privacy with regard to 
reproductive decisions.39 In Roe, the Court found that “[t]his 
right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”40 The 
Court also based a woman’s right to abortion, in part, upon the 
autonomy of medical professionals, stating: 
 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician 
to administer medical treatment according to his 
professional judgment up to the points where 
important state interests provide compelling 
justifications for intervention. Up to those points, 
the abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, 
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the 
physician.41 
 
Although the Court found that women have a fundamental 
right to have an abortion, at least prior to viability of the fetus, 
 
37. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
39. 410 U.S. at 154. The Supreme Court had explicated the privacy right 
regarding reproductive decisions. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
40. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
41. Id. at 165-66. Described by some scholars as a “medical model of 
abortion,” this model has been present since the first right-to-life movement 
began in 1850. B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 507 (2009); see generally KRISTIN LUKER, 
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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this right was grounded in women’s relationships with their 
physicians. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Roe found that 
this right to privacy was not absolute.42 The Court determined 
that during the first trimester of pregnancy, there were no 
state interests sufficiently strong to override a woman’s right to 
abort and thus, no state regulations would be constitutional at 
that time.43 During the second trimester, only the state’s 
interest in regulating abortion for the protection of the 
woman’s health would be allowed.44 Finally, during the third 
trimester, the state’s interest in potential life is sufficiently 
strong to justify the complete prohibition of abortion except 
where it is necessary to protect the life or the health of the 
pregnant woman.45 The relevance of the third trimester was its 
association with the notion of fetal viability—the point in time 
when the fetus could, theoretically, survive on its own outside 
the womb.46 The Court seemed to indicate that if the point of 
viability were pushed forward in time due to scientific 
advances, then the state’s interest in potential life would also 
be pushed forward along with it.47 Thus, the Court in Roe 
created a legal framework that balanced the fundamental right 
of privacy afforded to pregnant women against the state’s 
interest in potential life.48 Ultimately, however, the Court in 
Roe gave women the right to make their own decisions 
regarding abortion prior to viability.49 As we shall see, this 
crucial promise made in Roe was not intended to be disturbed 
by the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.50 
 
 
 
 
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. 
43. Id. at 162-64. 
44. Id. at 163-65. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 160, 163. 
47. Id. at 163-65. 
48. Id. at 159. 
49. Id. at 163. 
50. See 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (“The woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a 
rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”). 
9
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B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey51 
 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
is an important turning point in the development of abortion 
law because, although it did not alter the Roe determination 
that women are the ultimate decision-makers regarding 
abortion pre-viability, it did significantly alter the framework 
used to determine the constitutionality of abortion 
regulations.52 
Turning to the substance of the decision, the justices who 
co-authored the plurality opinion recognized that, in addition to 
protecting the health of the pregnant woman, states have a 
legitimate interest in protecting the life of the fetus from the 
point of conception.53 Prior to viability, the states’ interest in 
protecting the life of the fetus is not strong enough either to 
allow a total ban on abortion or to create regulations that 
impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose 
abortion.54 The Court explained that an undue burden is 
“shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”55 Thus, 
“[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound 
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to 
choose.”56 After a fetus reaches viability, however, states are 
free to prohibit abortion unless the abortion is necessary to 
protect the life or health of the mother, in accordance with 
Roe.57 
But at what point does a regulation present a substantial 
 
51. Id. at 833. 
52. Id. at 871-72. 
53. Id. at 869. 
54. Id. at 878-79. 
55. Id. at 877. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 879 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65). See Wharton, et al., supra 
note 29, at 330-31. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion?58 In applying the new 
“undue burden” standard, the Casey Court upheld a regulation 
requiring that: (a) at least 24 hours before performing an 
abortion, the physician inform the pregnant woman of the 
nature of the procedure, the health risks of both the abortion 
and of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the 
unborn child” (except in a medical emergency), and (b) the 
pregnant woman give her written consent to the procedure.59 
Prior to Casey, this type of law requiring specific counseling 
information and a 24-hour waiting period had been struck 
down by the Court.60 In Casey, however, the Court recognized 
that a state may “further its legitimate goal of protecting the 
life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a 
decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing 
the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”61 
For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized a state right 
to create mechanisms designed to impact the decision-making 
processes of women choosing abortion. 
Determining what precedent Casey set here poses a 
challenge, however, even for legal scholars, because of the 
nature of the plurality decision.62 Three justices (O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter) co-authored the Casey opinion, and 
certain sections of that opinion were joined in by two additional 
justices (Stevens and Blackmun), and are therefore legally 
binding.63 Both Stevens and Blackmun dissented from the 
portion of the decision establishing the undue burden standard 
and both rejected the claim that the regulations did anything to 
advance informed consent.64 The precedential value of these 
 
58. See infra Parts III and IV for analysis regarding the meaning of a 
“substantial obstacle” and its application to the Texas Sonogram Act. 
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. 
60. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 476 
U.S. 747, 759-60 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. 
(Akron I), 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983). 
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
62. Since Casey was decided, however, a majority of the Supreme Court 
used this standard. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007); 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 
U.S. 968, 971 (1997). 
63. Casey, 505 U.S. 843, 922 (1992) 
64. Id. at 914-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 922-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
11
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sections is ambiguous at best, a fact that many seem to have 
ignored as abortion law has evolved during the 15 years since 
Casey.65 
Since the decision in Casey, the constitutional protection 
afforded the right to choose abortion is not as clear as it once 
was under Roe. Under Roe, abortion was protected as a 
fundamental privacy right afforded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.66 The constitutional analysis 
in Roe regarding the fundamental right of privacy with respect 
to abortion dovetailed with other decisions involving the 
protection of fundamental rights in general.67 Specifically, 
states may not infringe upon a fundamental right in the 
absence of a compelling government interest, and, even then, 
states must use the least restrictive means to achieve such 
interest (the strict scrutiny test).68 In Roe, the court found that 
the protection of potential life is not a compelling government 
interest until the point of viability and, thus, it would follow 
that any regulation of abortion for the sole purpose of 
protecting potential life prior to viability would be 
unconstitutional.69 Although states could enact regulations 
protecting the fetus post-viability, that right would be 
subordinate to a woman’s right to protect her own life and 
health where the two rights conflict.70 
Following Casey, however, abortion regulations that take 
 
65. Lower courts appear to be adopting this as the new constitutional 
test for abortion regulations. See, e.g., Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. 
Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 367-74 (6th Cir. 2006); A Woman's Choice-East Side 
Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 690-93 (7th Cir. 2002); Fargo 
Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 530-36 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 452-461 (W.D. Ky. 2000). Also, one 
recent Note has even claimed that Casey created “a binding standard for 
evaluating the constitutionality of abortion informed consent statutes” even 
though only three justices actually supported that standard in the case. 
Moredock, supra note 29, at 1987. 
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). 
67. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. (Akron I), 462 
U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-
85 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. 
69. See supra Part II.A. 
70. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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effect prior to the viability of the fetus are no longer subject to 
strict scrutiny.71 Instead, regulations that serve a permissible 
government interest may be upheld so long as they do not pose 
an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to choose abortion.72 
Thus, although Casey clearly still meant to afford women the 
right to choose abortion prior to viability, determining exactly 
what this new undue burden standard means from a 
constitutional perspective is extremely difficult given the fact 
that only three of nine Supreme Court justices created an 
entirely new framework of constitutional analysis.73 
Of further interest, five of the justices joined in a 
discussion in Casey that suggests a significantly different 
constitutional grounding for the right to abortion compared to 
Roe. The Court said: 
 
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow 
that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all 
instances. That is because the liberty of the 
woman is at stake in a sense unique to the 
human condition and so unique to the law. The 
mother who carries a child to full term is subject 
to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that 
only she must bear. That these sacrifices have 
from the beginning of the human race been 
endured by woman with a pride that ennobles 
her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a 
bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the 
State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her 
suffering is too intimate and personal for the 
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision 
of the woman’s role, however dominant that 
vision has been in the course of our history and 
our culture. The destiny of the woman must be 
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of 
her spiritual imperatives and her place in 
 
71. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
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society.74 
 
The language suggests something that feminists have long 
supported regarding abortion: that abortion is not just about 
“privacy” as Roe had maintained, but that without the right to 
choose abortion, women do not have rights to equal 
citizenship.75 The notion in Roe that abortion should be seen 
merely as another medical decision made between patient and 
doctor appears to be giving way to a view of abortion as central 
to women’s liberty and equality. On the face of it, this would 
appear to be an important victory for those who argue for 
reproductive rights.76 But, while Casey reframed a woman’s 
decision to terminate a pregnancy in a way that no longer 
views doctors as primary actors in the abortion decision, many 
states have used this as a way to further burden both the 
abortion decision and those doctors who remain willing to 
perform abortions.77 This consequence of Casey becomes much 
more apparent when examined in light of Gonzales v. 
Carhart,78 discussed below. 
 
C. Gonzales v. Carhart79 
 
Gonzales v. Carhart addresses the constitutionality of the 
 
74. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
75. See e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality 
Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 
994, 1011 & n.92 (2007). 
76. Some commentators have suggested that the Court may have 
intentionally used such strong language in recognition of the ultimate 
weakening that they were about to do with regard to constitutional protection 
of the abortion right. See Borgmann, supra note 29, at 679. But see Reva 
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696-97 (2008) (arguing that the strong 
language reflects the majority’s concern with a multi-dimensional aspect of 
dignity, including the dignity of protecting life of the unborn, liberty, and the 
equality of women) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection]. 
77. See Wharton, et al., supra note 29, at 319-21. During the time 
between 1985 and 1991, states enacted sixty-eight laws restricting abortion, 
while from 1992 to 2005 states enacted 299 laws restricting abortion. See id. 
at 319 n.8 (citing Memorandum from Elizabeth Nash, Pub. Policy Assoc. Alan 
Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with authors)). 
78. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
79. Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, a federal law banning the 
use of intact D&E (dilation and evacuation) or intact D&X 
(dilation and extraction), popularly known as “partial-birth 
abortion.”80 A brief discussion of various types of abortion 
procedures will be helpful to understand the issues addressed 
in Gonzales. Between 85-90% of abortions occur in the first 
trimester and utilize either vacuum aspiration, wherein the 
contents of the uterus are removed via suction, or medical 
abortion, which consists of a pill often taken at home.81 In the 
large majority of second and third trimester abortions, doctors 
perform a procedure known as D&E (herein called “standard 
D&E”), which requires the physician to dilate the cervix and 
then insert surgical instruments through the cervix to evacuate 
the fetus.82 This requires several passes, as the fetal remains 
are removed in stages.83 Intact D&E or D&X, the procedure at 
issue here, differs from standard D&E in that the physician 
evacuates the fetus from the uterus with only one pass.84 
Because intact D&E ensures complete evacuation of the fetus, 
it reduces the likelihood of medical complications that are 
present in a standard D&E.85 This is due to the failure to fully 
evacuate the fetus despite several passes, the higher risk of 
perforation or damage to the pregnant woman’s body due to 
multiple insertions of surgical instruments, and the potential 
exposure of the pregnant woman to sharp bony fragments.86 An 
oft-cited study of the incidence of so-called partial-term 
abortion conducted prior to the passage of the Partial-Birth 
 
80. Id. at 132, 136-37; 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012). 
81. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence & 
Services In the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. 
HEALTH 6, 12-13 (2003); David K. Turok et al., Second Trimester Termination 
of Pregnancy: A Review by Site and Procedure Type, 77 CONTRACEPTION 155, 
155 (2008). 
82. See Phillip G. Stubblefield et al., Methods for Induced Abortion, 104 
AM. C. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS 174, 179 (2004); see also Stephen T. 
Chasen et al., Dilation and Evacuation at  20 weeks: Comparison of 
Operative Techniques, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1180, 1180 
(2004). 
83. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925-26 (2000). 
84. See id. at 927-28 (2000) (describing such procedures); see also 
Stubblefield et al., supra note 82, at 179. 
85. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161-62 (2007). 
86. Id at 177-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Abortion Act estimated that intact D&E was quite rare, 
accounting for only 0.03%-0.05% of all abortions that occurred 
in the United States in 1996.87 
Specifically, the Partial-Birth Abortion Act bans any doctor 
from knowingly performing a “partial-birth” abortion unless it 
is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.88 “Partial-
birth” abortion was described as occurring when the person 
performing the abortion: 
 
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers 
a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first 
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the 
body of the mother, or, in the case of breech 
presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the 
navel is outside the body of the mother, for the 
purpose of performing an overt act that the 
person knows will kill the partially delivered 
living fetus; and performs the overt act, other 
than completion of delivery, that kills the 
partially delivered living fetus.89 
 
Interestingly, a very similar law passed in Nebraska was 
found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2000 in 
Stenberg v. Carhart.90 One main difference between the 
Nebraska law and the Partial-Birth Abortion Act, according to 
the Gonzales Court, is that the description of “partial-birth” 
abortion in the federal law was more precise and could not be 
interpreted to include standard D&E procedures.91 The Court 
believed this allowed physicians more precise notice regarding 
banned procedures and left the practice of standard D&E 
 
87. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the 
United States, 1995-1996, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 263, 287 (1998), available at 
http://sparky.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3026398.html (last visited Jan. 7, 
2014). 
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012). 
89. See id. § 1531(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
90. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000). 
91. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 148-50 (majority opinion); cf. Stenberg, 530 
U.S. at 941-46. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
  
144 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
undisturbed.92 Nonetheless, many doctors disagreed with this 
conclusion by the Court.93 
The statute also included a provision which allowed a 
doctor who performed such an abortion to mount a legal 
defense based on the claim that, “the physician’s conduct was 
necessary to save the life of the mother whose life was 
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical 
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused 
by or arising from the pregnancy itself.”94 The availability of a 
legal defense is markedly different from an outright exception 
from the ban in cases where the mother’s life is in danger. It is 
crucial to note that, since Roe, all post-viability abortions may 
be banned so long as there is an exception allowing for an 
abortion necessary to protect the life or the health of the 
pregnant woman (a “health exception”).95 Here, although the 
ban on post-viability intact D&E on its face seems 
constitutional since the government is free to ban all abortions 
post-viability in general, the fact that this statute does not 
contain a health exception places it out of touch with the 
requirements in Roe and Casey. In fact, this was one of the 
main reasons why the Nebraska statute was found to be 
unconstitutional in the 2000 case.96 The other important thing 
to note here is that this ban is actually being imposed not only 
on post-viability abortions but on pre-viability abortions as 
well.97 Thus, to be found constitutional following Casey, the 
Court also had to determine whether this ban created an undue 
burden for women seeking a second term pre-viability abortion. 
In a five-to-four opinion, the Supreme Court upheld this 
act as constitutional.98 Most importantly for our purposes, the 
Court found that this Act does not pose an undue burden on a 
woman’s right to abortion, even with the lack of a health 
 
92. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 151-56. 
93. See Michael F. Greene, The Intimidation of American Physicians – 
Banning Partial-Birth Abortion, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2128, 2128 (2007). 
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(1). 
95. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). 
96. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38. 
97. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77. 
98. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). 
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exception.99 To begin its analysis of this statute, the majority 
opinion claimed that Casey supported the proposition, among 
other things, “that the government has a legitimate and 
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.”100 
The majority declared that, “we must determine whether the 
Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government in 
protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child.”101 
Thus, the majority starts their constitutional analysis of this 
statute by assuming that a regulation on abortion, which 
applies even pre-viability, may still be found constitutional if 
its sole purpose is simply to protect the life of the fetus.102 Of 
course, the regulation still cannot have the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the pregnant 
woman seeking an abortion.103 The Court said: 
 
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does 
not impose an undue burden, the State may use 
its regulatory power to bar certain procedures 
and substitute others, all in furtherance of its 
legitimate interests in regulating the medical 
profession in order to promote respect for life, 
including life of the unborn.104 
 
Further, the majority found that the statute in question 
did in fact further its purported purposes.105 The Court 
recognized that even standard D&E could be seen as devaluing 
life, but that by banning the intact D&E procedure, Congress 
had “additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a 
special prohibition.”106 The Court argued that this procedure’s 
similarity to infanticide raised the need to create a bright line 
between the two acts, which this ban accomplished.107 In 
 
99. Id. at 164-68. 
100. Id. at 145. 
101. Id. at 146. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 158. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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addition, the Court argued that the statute recognizes the 
reality that, “[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate 
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”108 
The Court then explained that abortion may lead to negative 
psychological consequences for many women.109 From this, the 
Court declared that due to the emotionally charged situation 
involving abortion, some doctors may not provide precise 
details regarding the abortion procedure that they plan to 
perform.110 The Court concluded that this lack of detail 
regarding the manner in which the fetus will be “killed” is a 
legitimate state concern for two reasons: (1) to preserve and 
protect the mental and emotional health of the mother, who 
may suffer even more intense emotional pain and suffering and 
ultimately regret the decision that she made to abort the fetus 
after she comes to find out about the manner in which the fetus 
was killed, and (2) to preserve fetal life because of the 
“reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation . 
. . will be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full 
term.”111 Thus, the Court concluded that the purpose of the ban 
was not to create a substantial obstacle in the path of the 
woman seeking an abortion, but instead to achieve the 
legitimate purpose of protecting and preserving maternal 
health and fetal life.112 
The majority recognized, however, that this was not the 
end of the inquiry and also examined whether the statute has 
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the 
woman seeking an abortion.113 Specifically, the Court spent 
some time discussing whether the lack of a health exception 
 
108. Id. at 159. 
109. Id. (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it 
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to 
abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and 
loss of esteem can follow.”) (citations omitted). 
110. Id. (noting, however, that this is a common occurrence with many 
types of surgical procedures). 
111. Id. at 159-60. Although the reason for this is not stated directly by 
the Court, the majority seems to be suggesting that this ban serves as a way 
to educate people regarding late term abortion in general, and is done in a 
way that will encourage women to choose against such abortions once they 
learn about the ban. 
112. Id. 
113. Id.at 158-61. 
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created an undue burden.114 Here, the Court acknowledged 
that if this ban of a particular abortion procedure did create 
significant health risks for women seeking abortions then the 
lack of a health exception would, in fact, pose an undue 
burden.115 The Court concluded, however, that since medical 
experts disagreed as to whether the ban of partial-birth 
abortion would give rise to significant health risks for women, 
this uncertainty in and of itself could justify the Court’s 
determination that the Act did not impose an undue burden.116 
The dissent written by Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued 
directly against a number of the arguments made by the 
majority and argued that the majority’s reasoning distorted the 
Court’s holdings in Casey.117 Many commentators agree with 
Ginsburg that the majority incorrectly applied the law to these 
issues.118 Ginsburg’s dissent takes aim at the majority’s claim 
that this law may stand even without a health exception.119 
Ginsburg argued that “a State must avoid subjecting women to 
health risks not only where the pregnancy itself creates 
danger, but also where state regulation forces women to resort 
to less safe methods of abortion.”120 Where a division of medical 
opinion exists regarding the necessity of a certain abortion 
procedure, the division itself should be understood to signal 
risk and the State must err on the side of safeguarding 
women’s health.121 Ultimately, she argued that the majority 
 
114. Id. at 161-67. 
115. Id. at 161. 
116. Id. at 163-64. 
117. See generally id. at 169-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
118. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: 
Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1601-02 
(2008); Manian, supra note 29, at 234, 262-63; Martha K. Plante, “Protecting” 
Women’s Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and 
Women’s Equal Right to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 389, 405-09 (2007); Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of 
Protection, supra note 76, at 1734-35, 1779-80; Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. 
Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1, 18-21 (2008); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., Ginsburg's Dissent May 
Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A31, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/opinion/oe-sunstein20. 
119. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 170-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 172. 
121. Id. at 173-74 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
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has carved out an unprecedented exception to the long-
standing requirement that all abortion regulations must first 
and foremost safeguard women’s health.122 
Ginsburg also addressed the majority’s claim that the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Act somehow furthers a legitimate 
government purpose.123 In response to the majority’s claim that 
this statute furthers the legitimate purpose of protecting fetal 
life, she pointed out that the statute does not save even one 
fetal life from destruction since other abortion methods remain 
available even if the ban persists.124 Additionally, the ban is 
obviously not designed for the purpose of protecting women’s 
health either.125 She said, 
 
the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for 
which it concededly has no reliable evidence: 
Women who have abortions come to regret their 
choices, and consequently suffer from [s]evere 
depression and loss of esteem. Because of 
women’s fragile emotional state . . . the Court 
deprives women of the right to make an 
autonomous choice, even at the expense of their 
safety.126 
 
In a full-page footnote she examined the weight of the scientific 
evidence that suggests that abortion is no more dangerous to 
women’s mental health than is bearing an unwanted child.127 
She then argued that this idea cannot even be seen as a 
legitimate purpose of a statute as it rests on “ancient notions 
about women’s place in the family and under the 
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”128 
Gonzales is a Supreme Court case and therefore does have 
bearing regarding how to analyze abortion regulations from a 
 
122. Id. at 179. 
123. Id. at 181-86 
124. Id. at 181. 
125. See id. at 177-80. 
126. Id. at 183-84 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127. Id. at 183 n.7. 
128. Id. at 185 (citations omitted). 
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constitutional perspective.129 However, it should be noted that 
Gonzales merely purported to apply Casey and not to change 
the nature of the undue burden test. The important question 
for our purposes then is: what insight does Gonzales add to 
Casey’s analysis? There are really two important aspects of this 
case to note for our discussion. First, Gonzales suggests that 
after Casey, states need only have a legitimate government 
interest to regulate abortion so long as the regulation does not 
impose an undue burden.130 Second, Gonzales seems to accept 
that women’s regret and other emotional problems after 
receiving an abortion are problems that may legitimately 
motivate a state regulation on abortion.131 These two claims 
will be further discussed in Part III and Part IV respectively. 
 
III. Understanding Casey’s Test 
 
Many theorists have argued that the undue burden 
standard and the way it is to be applied as explained in Casey 
is unclear, malleable, and even potentially contradictory.132 
Others have argued that Casey only outlaws abortion 
regulations that act as a complete bar to women’s ability to 
receive an abortion, or, at least, actively prevent a large 
fraction of women affected by the regulation from being able to 
receive an abortion.133 Another misconception regarding Casey 
is that an undue burden is coextensive with a finding that a 
regulation is requiring information that is untruthful, 
 
129. See generally id. at 132 (majority opinion). 
130. Id. at 146, 150. 
131. Id. at 159. 
132. See e.g. Borgmann, supra note 29, at 681 (“Casey’s standard lacks 
content, which makes it both difficult to apply and susceptible to 
manipulation.”); C. Elaine Howard, The Roe’d to Confusion: Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (1993). It is interesting 
to note that the Justices joining in the Casey joint opinion noted that the 
Court and individual members thereof had inconsistently applied the undue 
burden standard in prior decisions. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). The joint opinion then goes on to attempt to 
clarify what is meant by the “undue burden” standard as applied to abortion 
regulations. See id. at 876-79. 
133. See Whitman, supra note 29, at 1985-91; Metzger, supra note 29, at 
2030-38; James M. Oleske, Jr., Note, Undue Burdens and the Free Exercise of 
Religion: Reworking a “Jurisprudence of Doubt,” 85 GEO. L.J. 751, 768 (1997). 
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misleading, or irrelevant.134 
Ultimately, very few theorists examining Casey have fully 
appreciated the level of protection it affords to women’s 
decision-making liberty.135 The only reasonable way to read 
Casey is to understand it as safeguarding a woman’s decision-
making process as strongly as it protects women’s ability to 
effectuate their decisions regarding abortion. This aspect of 
Casey seems to be universally undervalued, and yet it is this 
aspect of Casey that most definitively shows why Texas’s 
sonogram law is unconstitutional. 
The most concrete “test” created in Casey, as we saw 
above, is the requirement that all state regulations on abortion 
enacted prior to viability cannot pose an undue burden.136 This 
was defined as a regulation that has “the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”137 From this statement, it 
seems clear that any state regulation on abortion must be 
examined to see whether its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a pregnant woman. This 
“test” raises many important questions when trying to 
determine whether a state regulation of abortion prior to 
viability is constitutional. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
In order to best understand the undue burden test in 
Casey, it helps to examine prior development of that standard. 
The Supreme Court first applied the undue burden standard to 
abortion law in 1983.138 In Akron I, Justice O’Connor addressed 
the concept of an undue burden in the dissent, defining as 
undue any regulations that act as “absolute obstacles or severe 
 
134. See Moredock, supra note 29, at 1976. 
135. But see Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection supra note 76, 
at 1753 (“[U]nder the undue burden framework, dignity-respecting regulation 
of women’s decisions can neither manipulate nor coerce women . . . .”). 
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 
137. Id. at 877. 
138. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. (Akron I), 
462 U.S. 416, 463-66 (1983) (O’Connor J., dissenting). 
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limitations on the abortion decision.”139 She suggested that if a 
state abortion regulation does not create an undue burden, 
then it is not unconstitutional.140 If such a regulation created 
an undue burden, however, it could nevertheless be upheld as 
constitutional if the state was able to show that the regulation 
serves a compelling government interest.141 
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this Akron I 
articulation of the undue burden standard142 by holding that 
any abortion regulation creating an undue burden is 
unconstitutional without the need for further examination.143 
Indeed, the state cannot rehabilitate an unconstitutional 
abortion regulation by demonstrating that it serves a 
compelling government interest. One issue not fully explicated 
by Casey, however, is what type of government interest must a 
state have to pass any abortion regulation, regardless of 
whether the regulation poses an undue burden.144 Can a state 
interfere with a woman’s right to privacy based solely upon the 
fact that it has a legitimate government purpose to which the 
law is rationally related? Or, must states show something more 
to justify the intrusion upon a fundamental right? 
Some, including the majority in Gonzales, have interpreted 
Casey to stand for the proposition that any abortion regulation 
that is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose is 
permissible so long as such regulation does not pose an undue 
burden.145 To understand Casey this way is to understand it as 
offering the least amount of constitutional protection, since this 
 
139. Id. at 464. 
140. Id. at 461-63. 
141. See id. at 472-74 (regarding the 24-hour waiting period 
requirement). 
142. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“To the extent that the opinions of the 
Court or of individual Justices use the undue burden standard in a manner 
that is inconsistent with this analysis, we set out what in our view should be 
the controlling standard.”) (citations omitted). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 877-79 
145. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (“Where it has 
a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State 
may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute others, 
all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical 
profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn”); 
see also Tobin, supra note 25, at 125-27; Metzger, supra note 29, at 2032-33. 
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would mean that a state only needs the same basic purpose to 
pass an abortion regulation as it would need to pass any other 
regulation that does not touch on a constitutionally protected 
right. Of course, reading Casey this way does not undo the 
requirement that the regulation cannot pose an undue burden, 
but it does allow for a requirement easily met regarding what 
purpose the state regulation must serve. Although we disagree 
with the framing of the test created in Casey this way, as it 
gives short shrift to a woman’s fundamental right to liberty in 
choosing abortion, we accept this as the correct test for the 
purpose of this Article. If we can show that the Texas 
Sonogram Law cannot even pass this easiest of constitutional 
burdens in terms of the permissible purposes of the law, then 
we have certainly shown it would fail if Casey is understood to 
require more than this. 
 
B. When is a Burden “Undue”? 
 
In Casey, an undue burden was defined as, “a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”146 This represents a significant change from 
Justice O’Connor’s language in Akron I of, “absolute obstacles 
or severe limitations on the abortion decision.”147 This changed 
language demonstrates the error of those who interpreted 
Casey to mean that an undue burden exists only when a 
regulation actually bars women from obtaining abortions. The 
burden clearly does not have to pose an absolute bar against 
abortion to be undue. Indeed, the Casey Court’s use of the 
language “substantial obstacle,”148 as opposed to “severe 
limitations,”149 certainly contemplates that a burden that does 
not serve as a full bar against abortion may nevertheless be 
“undue.” 
Additionally, there is an even stronger argument that 
shows why the interpretation of “undue burden” as requiring 
 
146. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
147. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. (Akron I), 462 
U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
148. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
149. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 464. 
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an absolute prohibition on certain women’s ability to get an 
abortion is setting the bar too high for a finding of an undue 
burden. The Court itself declared that certain kinds of 
information are unconstitutional based on the way that 
information interferes with women’s decision-making 
process.150 This is true regardless of whether this information 
actually prevents women from having or choosing abortions. To 
see this more clearly, we must examine what Casey said 
regarding specific information that may be required for 
informed consent statutes regulating abortion. 
Advancing the informed consent of women deciding on 
abortion is clearly a permissible purpose for state regulations 
on abortion after Casey. The Court stated, “[t]hough the woman 
has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy 
before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is 
prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is 
thoughtful and informed.”151 In further explaining this 
statement, the Court added that certain pieces of information 
unrelated to medical risks or other medical aspects of abortion 
may be included as part of the state regulation of information 
prior to obtaining an abortion.152 
 
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the 
State may enact rules and regulations designed 
to encourage [the pregnant woman seeking an 
abortion] to know that there are philosophic and 
social arguments of great weight that can be 
brought to bear in favor of continuing the 
pregnancy to full term and that there are 
procedures and institutions to allow adoption of 
unwanted children as well as a certain degree of 
state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the 
child herself. . . . It follows that States are free to 
 
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 881-85. 
151. Id. at 872. 
152. Id. at 882-83. The AMA recognizes, generally, the risks and benefits 
of treatment. See Sarah Runels, Informed Consent Laws and the Constitution: 
Balancing State Interests with a Physician's First Amendment Rights and a 
Woman's Due Process Rights, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 185, 186 
(2009). 
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enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for 
a woman to make a decision that has such 
profound and lasting meaning.153 
 
Casey also held that the government’s interest in protecting 
potential life is a permissible purpose for which states may 
create regulations under certain circumstances.154 However, 
where state regulations require women to receive certain 
information prior to an abortion, those regulations cannot 
hinder her choice.155 Indeed, “the means chosen by the State to 
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to 
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”156 Nonetheless, 
the joint opinion even went so far as to say that a regulation 
designed to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion may be permissible.157 In order to promote its interest 
in potential life, “the State may take measures to ensure that 
the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to 
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their 
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion.”158 
In keeping with their claim that regulations cannot hinder 
a woman’s free choice, the joint opinion determined that not all 
information designed to persuade women to choose childbirth 
may be included as part of a valid state regulation of 
abortion.159 The Court stated that, “[i]f the information the 
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful 
and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”160 
The Justices also suggested that the information must be 
relevant to the decision being made by concluding that, 
“informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that 
all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made 
 
153. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73. 
154. Id. at 875-78. 
155. Id. at 877. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 877-78. 
158. Id. at 878. 
159. Id. at 882-83. 
160. Id. at 882. 
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irrelevant.”161 Thus, states may constitutionally require 
abortion providers to inform pregnant women of more than just 
the normal medical risks of abortion, provided that such 
information is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.162 
It is in looking at the way the Court spoke of these dual 
purposes—the protection of potential life and of women’s right 
to informed consent—that we see what so many people have 
missed when examining Casey. Information that a state 
mandates to be provided to a pregnant woman seeking an 
abortion may constitute an undue burden not only if it 
substantially interferes with a woman’s ability to effectuate her 
choice to have an abortion, but also if it interferes in a 
substantial way with the decision-making process itself. The 
Court’s own language bears repeating: “the means chosen by 
the State to further the interest in potential life must be 
calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”163 
First, states may affect a woman’s decision-making process 
by providing persuasive information meant to influence a 
woman’s ultimate decision whether to terminate a pregnancy 
without violating her rights.164 However, if a state interferes 
with a woman’s decision-making process by providing her with 
false, misleading, or irrelevant information, it imposes an 
undue burden upon her decision-making ability and is, thus, 
unconstitutional.165 
Second, Casey shows that interference with a woman’s 
decision-making process may be unconstitutional even if it does 
not fully impede her ability to choose.166 By barring absolutely 
information that is untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant, the 
Court suggested that information that does not ultimately 
affect a woman’s choice could nevertheless constitute an undue 
burden.167 A woman does not, for example, have to prove that 
misleading information directly affected her decision. Rather, 
the very fact that the information is misleading renders it 
 
161. Id. at 883. 
162. Id. at 883. 
163. Id. at 877 (emphasis added). 
164. Id. at 878. 
165. Id. at 878, 882. 
166. Id. at 882-84. 
167. Id. at 882. 
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impermissible. Thus, untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant 
information is a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to 
make a reasoned and well-informed decision—simply put, it 
hinders her free choice. 
The above standard cannot be understood as applying only 
to information that is untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant in a 
narrow sense. This same result applies to any information 
required by states that unduly interferes with a woman’s 
decision-making process and hinders her free choice. As 
discussed in Part IV, this understanding of Casey’s holding is 
consistent with a general understanding of informed consent.168 
Further, the conclusion that Casey’s undue burden standard 
must be understood as placing an absolute ban on information 
that is untruthful, misleading, irrelevant or otherwise hinders 
a woman’s free choice is supported by both Blackmun’s 
concurrence and issues raised in Scalia’s dissent. 
First, Blackmun’s concurrence recognized that the joint 
opinion must be read as a general prohibition on states’ 
attempts to unduly interfere with women’s decisions. As he 
said, “[b]ecause the State’s information must be ‘calculated to 
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it,’ the measures 
must be designed to ensure that a woman’s choice is ‘mature 
and informed,’ not intimidated, imposed, or impelled.”169 He 
went on to argue that this would outlaw not only untruthful, 
misleading, or irrelevant information, but also the State must 
be careful of the manner of presentation it uses and cannot 
pick a mode “in order to inflict ‘psychological abuse,’ designed 
to shock or unnerve a woman seeking to exercise her liberty 
right.”170 This would prohibit the showing of “graphic literature 
or films,” for example, “detailing the performance of an 
abortion [procedure]” according to Blackmun.171 Thus, 
Blackmun explicitly recognized that information designed to 
hinder a woman’s decision-making process is unconstitutional 
even under the lesser protection afforded by the Casey joint 
opinion and in the absence of any showing that the information 
 
168. See infra Part IV. 
169. Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
170. Id. (citations omitted). 
171. Id. 
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acted as a complete prohibition on her ability to seek an 
abortion.172 
Second, Scalia’s dissent in Casey generally blasted the 
undue burden standard as being inherently unworkable and 
clearly not found in the constitution.173 He also argued that the 
undue burden standard seems to stand for the proposition that 
any regulation that works too well, in other words which 
significantly reduces the number of abortions, must be an 
undue burden.174 The example he gave to demonstrate this is if 
a state required women to read a pamphlet detailing the facts 
of fetal development and this reduced the number of abortions, 
then this could be found to be an undue burden.175 However, 
take another example of the same type of reasoning he 
employed here. What if a state decided to fully fund pregnancy, 
childbirth, and all childcare needed after birth including 
daycare for women who are in difficult financial circumstances 
and the state required all women be given this information 
before having an abortion? This might significantly decrease 
the abortion rates in that state so this too would be an undue 
 
172. Id. at 935. 
173. Id. at 985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
174. Id. at 992. 
175. Id. Justice Scalia stated, 
 
If, for example, a State required a woman to read a 
pamphlet describing, with illustrations, the facts of fetal 
development before she could obtain an abortion, the effect 
of such legislation might be to “deter” a “significant number 
of women” from procuring abortions, thereby seemingly 
allowing a district judge to invalidate it as an undue 
burden. Thus, despite flowery rhetoric about the State's 
“substantial” and “profound” interest in “potential human 
life,” and criticism of Roe for undervaluing that interest, the 
joint opinion permits the State to pursue that interest only 
so long as it is not too successful. As Justice B[lackmun] 
recognizes (with evident hope), the “undue burden” 
standard may ultimately require the invalidation of each 
provision upheld today if it can be shown, on a better record, 
that the State is too effectively “express[ing] a preference for 
childbirth over abortion.” Reason finds no refuge in this 
jurisprudence of confusion. 
 
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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burden under Scalia’s reasoning. However, this is quite 
obviously an incorrect interpretation of what the Court meant 
by an undue burden. 
Scalia’s mistake here is to suggest that any regulation that 
successfully decreases abortion rates must be an undue burden. 
The joint opinion in Casey, though, clearly was not arguing for 
this position. This highlights the point above that attempts to 
persuade women to choose childbirth, no matter how 
successful, are not undue burdens. However, when these 
attempts take the form of hindering women’s free choice by 
interfering in the decision-making and reasoning process of the 
woman, then an undue burden is found. This mistake made by 
Scalia actually shows that the joint opinion in Casey obviously 
understood the difference between regulations that worked to 
change women’s minds legitimately and ones that worked to 
change women’s minds in an unconstitutional way. 
The above explanation of Casey shows that abortion 
regulations requiring doctors to provide specific information to 
women seeking an abortion are constitutional only if that 
information: (1) is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, and 
(2) does not unduly interfere with a woman’s decision-making 
process.176 The undue burden standard also can be used to 
invalidate state provisions beyond these cases as well. The 
undue burden standard created two “prongs” of analysis in 
assessing state regulations: purpose and effect. 
 
C. Constitutional Purpose and Effect of the Law 
 
First, the undue burden test itself makes clear that the 
purpose of “placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the 
woman seeking an abortion” is not a permissible government 
purpose.177 Proving that the legislature has acted with an 
 
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
177. Id. at 878. Following Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), 
some say this “prong” of the test has been written out, but Mazurek itself did 
not hold this directly and does not overturn the plain wording of Casey here. 
See Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed 
“Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2566-67 (2006); see also Wharton, et al., 
supra note 29, at 346 (arguing Mazurek is not the death of the purpose 
prong); Whitman, supra note 29, at 1982. 
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impermissible purpose can be extremely difficult, however. 
Further, since many have interpreted Casey to require that a 
state only show that a regulation is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose,178 it is relatively easy for 
legislatures to be able to pass this test. Finally, even the notion 
of a legitimate purpose has been expanded to include 
questionable government purposes. Specifically, in Casey the 
Court held that a state regulation with the purpose of 
protecting women’s health or safety is permissible, but the 
State cannot create unnecessary health regulations that do no 
more than pose an undue burden in the name of women’s 
health.179 After Gonzales, however, state regulations designed 
to prevent women from having emotional problems after 
abortions they come to regret are also seen to legitimately 
serve this interest.180 Thus, Gonzales sanctioned states to 
create regulations on abortion with the purpose of, in effect, 
protecting women from themselves. This prong then appears to 
be a rather weak mechanism for invalidating legislation. 
The Casey joint opinion also analyzed whether a state 
regulation has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion in a way that goes beyond 
requiring the information provided to be truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant.181 The Court took up the issue of 
whether a regulation has the effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in a woman’s path when it considered the various 
provisions of the law under review in Casey.182 First, the three-
justice opinion concluded that the twenty-four hour waiting 
period and counseling provisions did not have the effect of 
creating a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions.183 
Although they accepted the findings of the District Court, 
which concluded that the waiting period might increase the 
 
178. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
179. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“[T]he State may enact regulations to 
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary 
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial 
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the 
right.”). 
180. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007). 
181. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78, 883. 
182. Id. at 879-901. 
183. Id. at 881-99. 
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cost and create a risk of delay for abortions, the justices 
concluded this was not enough to pose a substantial obstacle.184 
They said, “[a] particular burden is not of necessity a 
substantial obstacle.”185 In explaining what an undue burden is 
and is not, the opinion here added, “[t]he fact that a law which 
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right 
itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or 
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to 
invalidate it.”186 
However, in reviewing the requirement that a woman 
must notify her spouse that she is having an abortion except in 
certain proscribed circumstances prior to obtaining an 
abortion, the opinion here declared this to have the effect of 
being a substantial obstacle.187 The opinion focused on the 
incidence of domestic violence in marriages and concluded that 
due to the abuse and intimidation that sometimes occurs in 
marriage, “[t]he spousal notification requirement is thus likely 
to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an 
abortion.”188 Importantly, the opinion did make clear here that 
even on a facial challenge like this one, the Court should not be 
looking at the impact on all women seeking abortions, nor even 
all women who might have to notify their spouses about 
abortion.189 Instead, when determining whether a regulation 
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle, the Court says, 
“[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for 
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law 
is irrelevant.”190 Using this standard then, the opinion defines 
as the target class, “married women seeking abortions who do 
not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who 
do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions.”191 Looking at 
this group, the Court concluded, “in a large fraction of cases in 
which [the spousal notification provision] is relevant, it will 
 
184. Id. at 887. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 874. 
187. Id. at 893-94. 
188. Id. at 893. 
189. Id. at 893-94. 
190. Id. at 894. 
191. Id. at 895. 
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operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to 
undergo an abortion.”192 Thus, to determine whether a 
regulation has the effect of creating a substantial obstacle for a 
facial challenge after Casey, the Court must examine how it 
affects the large fraction of relevant women who will be 
affected by the regulation.193 
The standards one should use to determine whether an 
abortion regulation places a substantial obstacle in the path of 
the woman have not been fully elucidated by the Court; 
nonetheless, a few clear principles emerge.194 First, even if a 
large number of women are slightly inconvenienced by a 
certain state abortion regulation, this alone does not constitute 
an undue burden.195 Second, even if a regulation operates in a 
way that it creates a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of 
only a small group of women, if those affected women are the 
ones that are restricted by the regulation, then the regulation 
does pose an undue burden.196 Third, if a state regulation has 
the effect of deterring women from having abortions, then it 
poses an undue burden.197 Fourth, if a state regulation only 
slightly increases costs and adds inconveniences, then it does 
not pose an undue burden.198 Finally, the Casey Court observed 
that “at some point increased cost could become a substantial 
obstacle.”199 This last point, although rather vague, certainly 
suggests that a regulation which increases costs significantly 
 
192. Id. 
193. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188-89 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
194. See Borgmann, supra note 29, at 683. 
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. 
196. Even for facial attacks of federal statutes, it appears the Casey 
Court did not use the stricter test of constitutionality developed in United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and instead determined that facial 
challenges of abortions statutes may succeed if a large fraction of relevant 
women are affected. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; see also John Christopher Ford, 
Note, The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on Abortion 
Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1445-46 (1997). The vast majority of federal 
circuits have rejected application of the so-called “Salerno test” to facial 
challenges of abortion regulations. See Wharton, et al., supra note 29, at 354 
& n.206. 
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. 
198. Id. at 886. 
199. Id. at 901. 
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may also constitute an undue burden.200 Whether a substantial 
obstacle exists in cases other than these remains open to 
reasonable interpretation and will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
In sum, any regulation on abortion must first be rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest including 
protecting women’s health and protecting fetal life.201 Next, any 
regulation that requires women to be given specific information 
prior to abortion is permissible so long as the information is 
truthful, non-misleading, relevant, and does not unduly hinder 
a woman’s decision-making process.202 Finally, any such 
regulation cannot have the effect of posing a substantial 
obstacle for a large fraction of the relevant group of women 
affected by the regulation in effectuating their choice.203 A 
substantial obstacle exists, at least, where women are deterred 
from having abortions by the regulation and where costs are 
made significantly higher, but not where costs and 
inconvenience are only slightly increased.204 
 
IV. Why the Texas Sonogram Act fails Casey’s Test for 
Constitutionality 
 
To begin, we must first ask whether the purpose of the 
Texas Sonogram Act is to serve a legitimate government 
purpose or, in the alternative, to place a substantial obstacle in 
the path of the woman seeking an abortion.205 Legal scholars 
have explored whether the United States Supreme Court would 
 
200. But see Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 466 F. Supp. 2d 
934, 946 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that a $100 increase in the cost of 
abortion, which equaled up to a 25% increase in the overall cost of the 
procedure, did not constitute an undue burden on the right to obtain an 
abortion), aff’d in part, rev'd in part, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006). 
201. Again, Casey may be interpreted to require a higher standard than 
this. See Tobin, supra note 25, at 125-26. But following Gonzales and other 
interpretations, we will assume that this is the standard for the purposes of 
this argument. 
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83. 
203. Id. at 895. 
204. Id. at 886. 
205. See supra Part III.B. (noting that abortion regulations that take 
effect prior to viability are no longer subject to strict scrutiny). 
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declare unconstitutional legislation regulating abortion that 
has an illegitimate purpose, even in circumstances when such 
legislation does not, in effect, create a substantial obstacle.206 
The Texas Sonogram Act does not present a case in which the 
purpose of the legislation is difficult to determine. To the 
contrary, the caption of the Texas Sonogram Act reads, 
“Voluntary and Informed Consent.”207 Proponents of this Act 
would argue that requiring a woman to undergo a sonogram 
and requiring her doctor to describe the images on the 
sonogram simply gives women information germane to their 
decisions. The sound of the heart auscultation and the sight of 
the fetal sonogram image are pieces of information that some 
women may indeed consider as part of the decision-making 
process, and thus the Act could be deemed rationally related to 
the legitimate government purpose of informed consent. We 
will therefore examine the next set of questions under Casey: 
(1) whether this information is relevant to the decision to have 
an abortion; (2) whether it is truthful and non-misleading; (3) 
whether it unduly hinders women’s decision-making process; 
and (4) whether it poses a substantial obstacle to the right to 
choose an abortion.208 
 
A. Relevant to Her Decision 
 
There are cases where information garnered by a 
sonogram may be quite relevant to a woman’s decisions 
regarding her pregnancy. For example, a sonogram could 
reveal fetal abnormalities or ectopic pregnancies. In addition, 
doctors may conclude for other reasons that a sonogram is 
medically necessary prior to administering an abortion.209 The 
Texas Sonogram Act, however, requires a woman to undergo a 
 
206. See Wharton, et al., supra note 29, at 346 (“[L]ower courts have 
misread Mazurek in precisely this manner, misconstruing it as the death of 
the purpose prong.”) (footnote omitted); see also Amy E. Crawford, Comment, 
Under Siege: Freedom of Choice and the Statutory Ban on Abortions on 
Military Bases, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1549, 1566 & n.98 (2004). 
207. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013). 
208. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877, 882-84 
(1992). 
209. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 346; see also Vandewalker, supra 
note 25, at 28. 
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sonogram and hear the description of its image in every case, 
regardless whether the sonogram is medically necessary.210 The 
issue, therefore, is whether states may determine that 
information proffered by a forced description of a sonogram is 
relevant to a woman who has chosen to have an abortion even 
in those cases in which the sonogram is not deemed medically 
necessary. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Court examined the relevancy of the sonogram requirement in 
2012. The Circuit Court stated, 
 
[T]he provision of sonograms and the fetal 
heartbeat are routine measures in pregnancy 
medicine today. They are viewed as ‘medically 
necessary’ for the mother and fetus. Only if one 
assumes the conclusion of Appellees’ argument, 
that pregnancy is a condition to be terminated, 
can one assume that such information about the 
fetus is medically irrelevant. The point of 
informed consent laws is to allow the patient to 
evaluate her condition and render her best 
decision under difficult circumstances. Denying 
her up to date medical information is more of an 
abuse to her ability to decide than providing the 
information.211 
 
The extraordinary aspect of this statement is that the court of 
appeals made this claim while reviewing a regulation that is 
triggered only when a woman has presented herself for an 
abortion.212 Thus, she has already decided that her pregnancy 
is a condition to be terminated when she is forced to undergo a 
sonogram. To describe the Texas sonogram requirement as 
being about “routine measures in pregnancy medicine”213 is to 
completely distort the situation for women to whom this 
 
210. § 171.012. 
211. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions Servs. v. Lakey, 667 
F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012). 
212. See id. at 573. 
213. Id. at 579. 
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legislation applies. Further, although this statement by the 
court of appeals suggests that a woman cannot truly decide to 
have an abortion without first having access to the information 
proffered by the sonogram, the court of appeals never makes 
clear why this would be so. 
Obviously the information garnered by a sonogram is not 
necessary for a woman to understand the effect of an abortion 
on a fetus; every competent woman seeking an abortion 
understands that abortion results in the destruction of the 
fetus. Perhaps the court of appeals is saying that states may 
determine that a woman cannot truly understand what 
abortion is without seeing or hearing a description of the fetus 
in her uterus at that moment. Why this would be the case is, 
again, never fully elucidated by the court. The court of appeals 
does, however, rely on the Supreme Court’s determination in 
Casey that, in the context of abortion, the concept of informed 
consent is “broad enough to include the potential impact on the 
fetus.”214 Understanding Casey’s determination of what is 
relevant to a woman’s decision for abortion then is important to 
determining whether the Act would fail the requirement of 
relevance here. 
The Casey Court concluded that the information doctors 
were required to provide to women seeking abortions, including 
the “probable gestational age of the unborn child,” could not be 
said to be entirely irrelevant to the woman’s decision to 
abort.215 The rationale to support this claim is rather 
surprising and merits examination. The Supreme Court stated, 
 
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-
being is a facet of health. Nor can it be doubted 
that most women considering an abortion would 
deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not 
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to 
ensure that a woman apprehend the full 
consequences of her decision, the State furthers 
the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a 
 
214. Id. at 580 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 883 (1992)). 
215. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83. 
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woman may elect an abortion, only to discover 
later, with devastating psychological 
consequences, that her decision was not fully 
informed.216 
 
This language suggests that the Supreme Court believed that 
some women undergoing abortions might not understand the 
consequences of an abortion for the fetus and will be 
psychologically damaged when they later learn the truth. 
However, this makes no sense if interpreted literally to mean 
that women don’t know abortion ends in the destruction of the 
fetus. Therefore, the Court must be relying on the notion that 
knowing the age of the fetus somehow relates to understanding 
what abortion is in another way. 
 The Court deciding Casey also suggested that 
information regarding the gestational age of the fetus is 
relevant to informed consent for the purpose of protecting the 
health of the woman.217 This idea was relied on heavily in 
Gonzales, as we saw, as a basis for removing a woman’s 
decision regarding an abortion procedure altogether.218 It is 
important to note, however, that the Court in Casey does not, 
in fact, rely on the claim that information regarding the 
consequences of abortion for the fetus is related to informed 
consent by protecting women’s psychological well-being. The 
Court seemed to recognize the possibility that this kind of 
information may not, ultimately, truly be found to relate to 
women’s health outcomes when they say that information 
about consequences to the fetus when one is having an abortion 
may be allowed “even when those consequences have no direct 
relation to her health.”219 
Nonetheless, the Court stated in Casey that information 
relating to the impact of an abortion upon a fetus may be 
relevant for other reasons.220 To support this view, the Court 
relied upon the example of a person undergoing a kidney 
 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 881-82. 
218. See supra Part III.C. 
219. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
220. Id. at 882-83 
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transplant, stating that information regarding health risks to 
the organ donor would be relevant to the transplant patient’s 
decision to undergo the procedure.221 This analogy further 
confuses the issue. Obviously a pregnant woman knows the 
“risks” of abortion for the fetus; the sole purpose of an abortion 
is to terminate the pregnancy. This analogy of the transplant 
patient taking into consideration the risks that the organ donor 
would be facing does not apply. Nonetheless, the Casey Court 
concluded that all of the required information including the 
information regarding the age of the fetus is relevant to a 
woman’s decision to abort.222 
Under the reasoning described above then, when applying 
Casey’s holding to the Texas Sonogram Act, are sonogram 
images (either described or viewed) relevant to a woman’s 
decision to abort such that they may be required as an aspect of 
informed consent? Requiring a woman to undergo a sonogram 
and either hear or see the results of this intrusive procedure is 
quite different from simply being told the approximate age of 
the fetus. First, in Casey, women were being given information 
about the approximate stage of fetal development of their 
pregnancies and this information could not likely be accurately 
obtained in another way.223 Other cases after Casey have held 
that states can even go so far as to include color pictures of 
fetal development at various stages to further women’s 
understanding of fetal development.224 So precisely what 
information does a sonogram image and the explanation 
thereof provide that cannot be obtain by these less intrusive 
means? 
It may be true that a woman who requests such 
information would find it relevant to her decision, but the 
argument that no woman can make a truly informed decision 
about abortion without seeing or hearing about the sonogram 
 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. See Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000); 
see also Moredock, supra note 29, at 1989 (“Even though some of the fetal 
development photographs included in the pamphlet [in Eubanks] were color-
enhanced and others were enlarged, the court found the materials to be 
‘truthful and not misleading.’”). 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/4
  
168 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
image of her fetus is seriously problematic. As discussed 
further below, a sonogram image is not an unqualified true 
fact, but an image that fails to disclose the full reality of 
pregnancy.225 Further, forcing women to have to view or hear 
about their own “individual” fetus is an obvious attempt to 
“personify the fetus.”226 If all the sonogram is meant to show is 
the stage of fetal development of the pregnancy, this 
information is already being provided in other ways. Thus, the 
sonogram is redundant and provides no new relevant 
information. 
Finally, this line of argument that no woman can give 
informed consent to an abortion without reviewing her 
sonogram information suggests that all women who choose 
abortion must not take the existence of the fetus seriously. It 
suggests that women cannot on their own make the connection 
between the fetus growing in their womb and the fact that it 
exists, that it will grow and develop, and that it may even 
become a newborn baby—their newborn baby. This claim 
diminishes the dignity of women who are sometimes put in the 
difficult position of choosing between a human organism 
starting to grow within them and all of the other commitments 
they already have, whether they be to children, jobs, schooling, 
or something else. To accept that viewing a sonogram is 
necessary for a woman to make an informed decision to abort is 
to accept unquestioningly a stereotypical pro-life view about 
women; that a woman would not choose to abort, but for the 
fact that she either does not know what abortion truly is or 
does not understand what she is truly doing when she has 
one.227 Taking this line of reasoning one step further provides a 
basis for states to ban abortions in order to protect women from 
themselves.228 
 
225. See infra Part IV.B. 
226. Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) 
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1341 (2009) (quoting 
Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4, at 1). 
227. See generally Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse 
of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 65-67 (1997) (discussing the use 
of fetal imagery by pro-life proponents in the abortion debate). 
228. Some commentators have suggested that Gonzales has already set 
us down this road by accepting the belief that women need to be protected 
from their own decision to abort. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 118, at 1617 
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B. Truthful and Non-misleading 
 
Regarding the Texas Sonogram Act, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit declared that, “required disclosures of a 
sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions 
are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information.”229 
Yet, even this seemingly non-controversial claim is arguable 
when examined in more depth. To begin, theorists have 
discussed the misleading nature of sonogram pictures in 
general; especially ones that are taken later in pregnancy and 
are often enhanced for the public eye.230 Sonograms produce 
images that are created rather than captured.231 The images 
popularly shown depict fetuses as small, baby-like entities, 
floating freely through what appears to be empty space.232 In 
fact, one description of the first widely-disseminated image of 
the developing fetus described it as, “[t]he unfinished child 
looking like an astronaut in its transparent bubble.”233 These 
visual images create the false picture that the fetus is a fully 
developed and independent entity, like a little baby trapped in 
a hostile environment. The relationship of the fetus to the 
pregnant woman disappears, and the role of the pregnant 
woman in fetal development is glaringly absent. In effect, these 
popularly disseminated sonogram images create an entity that 
simply does not exist—a fetus that is physically independent 
 
(“With Gonzales v. Carhart came a double bind: neither the traditional 
disclosure standard nor a heightened one offered an adequate means of 
protecting women's interests. Put differently, the Supreme Court has gone 
from saying that the government may not require, as part of informed 
consent, information that is designed to discourage the abortion choice, to 
saying that the government may require such material so that women will 
make ‘mature and informed’ decisions and will be protected from later regret, 
to saying that the government may simply eliminate an abortion choice so 
that women are protected both from the anxiety that adequate information 
could provoke and from the regret that could come if later they were to learn 
that information.”) (footnotes omitted). 
229. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions Servs. v. Lakey, 667 
F.3d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir. 2012). 
230. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual 
Culture in the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 280-83 (1987). 
231. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the 
Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 378-79 (2008). 
232. Petchesky, supra note 230, at 270. 
233. Sanger, supra note 231, at 355 (footnote omitted). 
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from the pregnant woman. To present the fetus as a separate 
entity is to obfuscate the reality of the pregnancy itself—the 
dependence of the fetus upon the pregnant woman’s body. 
Surely, this type of sonogram image can be said to be 
misleading then in that the pregnant woman and her 
experience of the pregnancy literally disappears from view. 
No doubt proponents of the Texas Sonogram Act would try 
to distinguish the sonogram image being described above from 
the one that a pregnant woman is forced to hear about and 
encouraged to see in Texas. Such proponents might argue that 
the sonogram image does not show a “created” baby-like fetus, 
but instead depicts the fetus as it exists at the moment when 
the woman carrying that fetus is deciding whether to terminate 
her pregnancy. Because most abortions are performed during 
the early stages of pregnancy, the images captured by a 
sonogram are not likely to be so compellingly baby-like and 
may, in fact, appear to be more blob-like than baby-like.234 
Regardless, the image of the fetus depicted by these sonograms 
remains totally divorced from its true context: one of complete 
embeddedness in the pregnant woman’s womb. In addition, 
sonographers often contribute to the “creation” of the fetal 
image in actual practice.235 What might appear to be a blob to 
the uneducated eye can be transformed into a head or an arm 
with the sonographer’s guidance.236 Some sonographers even 
ascribe meaning to movements beyond what can possibly be 
true, such as in descriptions of the fetus as “waving” or 
“hiding.”237 
The fact that this sonogram is of the pregnant woman’s 
actual fetus may make it more misleading in some ways rather 
than less. Not only does a sonogram perpetuate the false image 
of the fetus as an independent entity, but it also invites a 
significantly higher emotional response among women because 
it personifies the fetus.238 As one commentator has said, “even a 
 
234. Id. at 369, 382-83. 
235. Id. at 368-70. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 369. 
238. Devins, supra note 226, at 1341 (citing Requirements for 
Ultrasound, supra note 4, at 1). Although this may be true, it is important to 
emphasize that this does not suggest that women are more emotional than 
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truthful message may be misleading when it inappropriately 
takes advantage of emotional influence to bias an individual’s 
decision away from the decision that would be made in a non-
emotional, fully informed state.”239 All relevant information 
regarding fetal development can be provided to pregnant 
women by legal means free of emotional influence and bias.240 
The Texas legislature, however, mandates a means that creates 
and then preys upon the heightened emotional state of the 
pregnant woman, thus misleading her.241 
Perhaps most misunderstood and overlooked in this 
discussion, however, is the meaning of the experience of a 
woman forced by the State to have a sonogram. As one theorist 
has noted: 
 
Mandatory ultrasound laws require women to 
participate physically in what has become a rite 
of full-term pregnancy: the first ultrasound. It 
now operates as an early step in prenatal care. 
By virtue of having the screening at all, women 
are scooped into the social category of pregnant 
women, however brief they intend that status to 
be.242 
 
The fact that it is the intrusive use of her own body, by 
capturing the sonogram image against her will, which 
transforms her experience of the pregnancy itself without her 
consent makes this violation even more egregious.243 This 
socially-conditioned response to having an ultrasound, the 
feeling that one has, even momentarily, been transformed into 
 
men in general or that women need to be protected from their own emotional 
vulnerability. This interpretation is problematic and must be overtly 
renounced. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: 
More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 33-36 (2011). 
239. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: 
Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008). 
240. Id. at 30. 
241. This problematic aspect of the required sonogram information is 
further discussed below. See infra Part IV.C. 
242. Sanger, supra note 231, at 382. 
243. Id. at 360. 
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a mother-to-be, robs women of the ability to make their own 
choices, free of bias, regarding how to view their state of 
pregnancy.244 Regardless whether this aspect of sonograms was 
a motivating factor for proponents of the Texas Sonogram Act, 
the requirement that all women seeking an abortion must first 
undergo the often emotionally intense first rite of passage into 
actual motherhood certainly can be misleading to women who 
do not see themselves as mothers. 
Therefore, not only is the image captured by the 
ultrasound misleading, but the social context of ultrasounds 
actually transforms pregnant women into would-be-mothers 
against their will, even if only temporarily. This entire process, 
as well as the images captured therein, does not appear to be 
the “epitome of truthful, non-misleading information” but, in 
fact, the exact opposite.245 
 
C. An Undue Burden on Women’s Decision-making Liberty 
 
Regardless of whether courts deem state-mandated 
information provided to women seeking abortions to be 
truthful, non-misleading, or relevant, courts may deem such 
information unconstitutional if it unduly hinders a woman’s 
decision-making process.246 Obviously, although these are 
separate grounds for determining the constitutionality of an 
abortion regulation, there is some overlap between the various 
grounds. A showing that a regulation requires the delivery of 
information that is untruthful, misleading or irrelevant may 
also be part of showing that such regulation unduly hinders a 
woman’s decision-making liberty.247 However, even information 
that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant in a narrow 
sense may pose an undue burden to women’s decision-making 
liberty if it otherwise unduly hinders her ability to choose 
freely.248 Thus, a court reviewing Texas’s sonogram law could 
 
244. Id. at 360, 373. 
245. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions Servs. v. Lakey, 667 
F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2012). 
246. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 
(1992). 
247. Id. at 875-76. 
248. Id. at 878. 
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reject the claim that the information it requires is misleading, 
but accept nonetheless the claim that the law violates women’s 
decision-making liberty protected by Casey. 
Precisely what type of interference with a woman’s 
decision-making process constitutes an undue burden? The 
Court has ruled that a mandate requiring the delivery of 
untruthful, misleading, and/or irrelevant information hinders a 
woman’s free choice, regardless whether such information 
significantly affected any woman’s decision.249 So, the crucial 
factor is not whether the required information actually 
succeeds in interfering with a woman’s decision-making 
process. Instead, the issue of an undue burden turns on the 
nature of the interference itself and the method by which it 
interferes with a woman’s decision. Information meant to 
persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion is 
constitutional.250 Information that manipulates, coerces, or 
otherwise disrupts a woman’s reasoning process presents an 
undue burden on her decisional liberty.251 
To understand why this is so, we will examine the 
philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine of informed 
consent. Although the legal doctrine of informed consent may 
not be fully illuminating regarding the Texas Sonogram Act,252 
the philosophical examination of informed consent concepts 
provide a rich theoretical framework to help assess Casey’s 
concern regarding burdens that interfere with a woman’s free 
choice. In this context, where we are dealing with statutes that 
relate to medical decision-making, the examination of informed 
consent from a philosophical perspective establishes clear 
concepts regarding what renders a choice “free.” These concepts 
help give content to the requirement that states may not create 
an undue burden on a woman’s free choice in terms of 
interferences with her reasoning process itself. Thus, the 
following analysis of what information may be impermissible 
for true informed consent is not relying on the legal doctrine of 
informed consent to argue that states cannot legally require 
 
249. See supra Part III.C. 
250. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra Part III.C. 
252. Sawicki, supra note 238, at 5-6. 
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certain impermissible information. Instead, the informed 
consent doctrine, which specifies what is necessary for “free 
choice,” is binding on states due to the constitutional 
requirement laid down in Casey that states may not unduly 
hinder a woman’s free choice. 
In addition, the purported purpose of the Texas Sonogram 
Act is to advance informed consent.253 Indeed, Casey explicitly 
relates the informational requirements in that case to the 
state’s asserted interest in “ensuring a decision that is mature 
and informed” and “to ensure an informed choice.”254 It 
therefore becomes necessary to examine both the legal and 
philosophical doctrines of informed consent in order to 
understand how far states may go in requiring information 
before they may be said to violate a woman’s decisional liberty. 
In the legal context, informed consent has its roots in the 
common law rule that any unwanted touching, even for the 
purpose of medical treatment, is a battery.255 Thus, only by 
receiving the consent of a person seeking medical treatment 
will a doctor have the right to treat him or her. This approach 
emphasizes an “individual’s right to control what happens to 
her body and to be protected from unwanted physical 
intrusions.”256 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has relied on 
this doctrine of consent prior to medical treatment as a 
foundation for a patient’s constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment under the Due Process Clause,257 demonstrating a 
nexus between informed consent and individual liberty via the 
Due Process Clause. Around the 1950’s, the legal and ethical 
concept of mere consent gave way to a requirement of informed 
consent.258 Consent is “informed” when the person in question 
has the capacity to make decisions about his medical care, is 
participating voluntarily in the decision-making, and has 
information adequate and appropriate to such decision.259 
 
253. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013). 
254. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992). 
255. See Manian, supra note 29, at 235-37. 
256. See Dresser, supra note 118, at 1602-03 (citation omitted). 
257. See Manian, supra note 29, at 237 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)). 
258. See Gold & Nash, supra note 25, at 6. 
259. See id. at 6-7 (citing 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
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Further, many statutes suggest that the necessary information 
required for medical treatment must provide patients with “a 
general understanding of the procedure, the medically 
acceptable alternative procedures or treatments, and the 
substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed 
treatment or procedures.”260  Informed consent statutes are 
animated by concepts that are deeply entrenched within the 
biomedical ethics scholarship. The paternalistic model of 
medicine, where doctors are seen as the one empowered to 
make decisions for the welfare of their patients, has been 
slowly replaced by the idea that competent patients must be 
the ones authorized to make their own decisions.261 Canterbury 
v. Spence, one of the leading cases discussing informed consent, 
recognized the underlying purpose of the informed consent 
doctrine was to show respect for a patient’s decision-making 
capacity.262 The recognition of the importance of this concept 
within a doctor-patient relationship has been the basis for one 
of the main bioethical principles—that of respect for 
autonomy.263 The bioethical principle of respect for autonomy is 
the idea that patients are “free to choose and act without 
controlling constraints imposed by others.”264 Autonomy 
requires that decision-making be “free from both controlling 
interference by others and from certain limitations such as 
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.”265 
This principle is based upon the belief that “each mature 
 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE 
DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED 
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT- PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 63 (1982) [hereinafter 
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]). 
260. See Tobin, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting FLA STAT. § 766.103(3)(a) 
(2005)); see also Dresser, supra note 118, at 1602-04; Runels, supra note 152, 
at 185-88. 
261. See Manian, supra note 29, at 235. 
262. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see 
also Manian, supra note 29, at 238. 
263. See Manian, supra note 29, at 240 n.112; Vandewalker, supra note 
25, at 5. 
264. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT 8 (1986). 
265. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 99 (6th ed. 2009). Autonomy is part of the basic standards 
of important medical organizations including the AMA and ACOG. See Gold 
& Nash, supra note 25, at 7; see also Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 67-69. 
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individual has a right to make the basic choices that affect her 
life prospects,”266 which brings to mind the Court’s 
determination in Casey that abortion regulations should 
“inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”267 
The concept of autonomy in biomedical principles, 
however, is not absolute. The principle of beneficence, the 
promotion of the welfare of others, is another central value of 
the doctor-patient relationship.268 These two principles may 
conflict with one another in cases where, for example, a patient 
chooses to forego a treatment necessary for her health. The 
doctrine of informed consent, and the Supreme Court in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, however, 
support the claim that, for competent individuals, when the 
two principles conflict the right to autonomy trumps the 
principle of beneficence.269 At other times, however, these two 
principles do work hand-in-hand. In fact, the doctrine of 
informed consent recognizes not only that the patient should be 
the ultimate decision-maker regarding her fate, but also that 
she may be the one in the best position to protect her own 
interests, including health outcomes, when given the proper 
information to decide.270 
The doctrine of informed consent also contains a well-
defined exception that allows for patients to opt out of receiving 
certain information even when it is relevant to and necessary 
for fully informed consent. The patient waiver exception, which 
allows patients to refuse to receive certain pieces of 
information, is widely recognized as valid.271 This exception is 
patently consistent with the principle of autonomy. If a patient 
chooses not to receive certain information, then the doctor 
 
266. Manian, supra note 29, at 240. 
267. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
268. See Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 34-35. 
269. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
270. See President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Values Underlying Informed 
Consent, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120-22 (David DeGrazia, Thomas A. Mappes, 
& Jeffrey Brand Ballard eds., 7th ed. 2011). 
271. See Manian, supra note 29, at 241 n.116; Vandewalker, supra note 
25, at 67-68 (citing Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee on 
Ethics Opinion No. 439, Informed Consent 1, 3 (2009)); see also Sawicki, 
supra note 238, at 34-35. 
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should respect that patient’s autonomy so long as the patient 
understands the consequences of his refusal.272 
An application of these principles of informed consent to 
abortion regulations demonstrates that some disclosures could 
violate the requirements of informed consent even if they are 
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. Take, for example, a 
statute that requires all women who are contemplating a 
second trimester but pre-viability abortion to view the fetal 
remains after an abortion of a fetus near the same age as the 
one they are carrying. Or, for a less controversial example, 
imagine a statute that required all men planning to undergo 
prostate surgery, a surgery that many patients often claim to 
regret,273 to watch the surgery being performed live before they 
could give their informed consent to the surgery. In each 
example, the information delivered to the patient is truthful, 
but the graphic nature of the information could violate respect 
for autonomy by unduly influencing that person’s decision.274 
How exactly does it do that, and what kind of graphic 
information might have this effect? 
One idea central to informed consent is that “[a] choice 
that has been coerced, or that resulted from serious 
manipulation of a person’s ability to make an intelligent and 
informed decision, is not . . . the person’s own free choice.”275 
The principle that people have the right to make their own 
decisions about medical care free from coercion and 
manipulation is part of the basic standards of many important 
 
272. See Manian, supra note 29, at 241; Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 
68. 
273. See Manian, supra note 29, at 257 (discussing the results of a study 
concluding that a number of men regret prostate surgery because they 
experienced reduced sexual function afterwards). 
274. Another independent ground for invalidating such statutes is the 
First Amendment right of physicians. As the district court said regarding the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold the Texas Sonogram Act, “The concept that 
the government may make puppets out of doctors, provided it does not step 
on their patients’ rights, is not one this Court believes is consistent with the 
Constitution, in the abortion context or otherwise.” Tex. Med. Providers 
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721, at *12-13 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). Thus, the First Amendment right of doctors also 
needs to be addressed in conjunction with women’s due process arguments. 
275. See Gold & Nash, supra note 25, at 7 (quoting MAKING HEALTH 
CARE DECISIONS supra note 259, at 63). 
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medical organizations including the American Medical 
Association, and the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecologists.276 
In Casey, the Court was concerned enough with 
regulations designed to manipulate a woman’s choice that it 
banned outright any state from requiring that misleading, 
untruthful, or irrelevant information be provided to women 
seeking an abortion.277 Some commentators have suggested 
that regulations which manipulate women’s free choice violate 
Casey as well.278 One theorist expressed his belief that: 
 
[A] communication designed to influence a 
woman’s decision whether to abort may be 
considered an undue burden when it is 
inappropriately manipulative (deliberately or 
not) by inducing fear or anxiety, or when it 
inappropriately affects her ability to decide, 
leading to a decision that she would not have 
made when not under the influence of such an 
emotion.279 
 
According to Reva Siegel, “[u]nder the undue burden 
framework, dignity-respecting regulation of women’s decisions 
can neither manipulate nor coerce women.”280 
Biomedical ethicists have studied when information 
manipulates choice so as to undermine informed consent by 
interfering with a patient’s ability to fully understand his or 
her options.281 This can occur by providing false or misleading 
information,282 by “framing” decisions in such a way that a 
choice or risk seems better or worse than it is,283 and by 
 
276. See id.; Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 68. 
277. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
278. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 239, at 31-32. 
279. Id. at 31 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
280. See Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 76, at 
1753. 
281. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 264, at 365-66; see also 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 265, at 130, 134. 
282. See Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 13-20. 
283. Id. at 38 (citing FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 264, at 320-21; 
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engaging in “psychological manipulation.”284 Psychological 
manipulation, which is the use of information to unduly 
influence a person’s decision, involves “appeals to emotional 
weaknesses, and the inducing of guilt or feelings of 
obligation.”285 This form of manipulation may not affect the 
patient’s understanding, but may nonetheless interfere with 
free choice by creating a heightened emotional state in the 
patient and then requiring the patient to decide while in such 
emotional state.286 This is exactly what the Texas Sonogram 
Act does.287 
The Texas Sonogram Act’s requirements that medical 
providers display a sonogram image of the fetus and present 
the fetal heartbeat to a woman seeking an abortion constitutes 
the provision of graphic information that manipulates a 
woman’s choice by appealing directly to her emotions.288 For 
those women who would choose to have the sonogram and/or 
hear the heartbeat, regardless whether it is mandated by the 
State, that information could be relevant to their decision and 
thus not manipulative of their choice. But, for all those women 
who would refuse a non-medically necessary sonogram and/or 
choose not to hear the results, requiring them to undergo such 
procedures against their will is an obvious attempt to 
manipulate their emotions in such a way as to influence their 
choice.289 It is simply an undue burden on a woman’s “free 
choice” when considering abortion. 
Proponents of the Texas Sonogram Act might argue that 
its purpose merely is to persuade a woman to decide against an 
abortion rather than to manipulate her decision.290 As 
discussed earlier, however, the sonogram itself and the 
description of the fetus both personify the fetus and transform 
the pregnant woman into a would-be mother.291 Such 
 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 265, at 130, 134). 
284. See id. at 39. 
285. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 264, at 366. 
286. See Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 42-44. 
287. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013). 
288. Id. § 171.012(a)(4). 
289. Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 43-44. 
290. Id. at 29-30. 
291. See supra Part IV.A. 
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information does not appeal to the process of reasoning in order 
to persuade; it appeals to her emotions in order to manipulate. 
It is true that not all emotional influences affecting a person’s 
decision are unduly manipulative, since people make decisions 
based on their own emotional experiences.292 Nonetheless, 
requiring the provision of information that attempts to 
encourage a certain decision by completely circumventing 
reasoned deliberation and instead inducing a certain emotional 
response is quite a different matter. This is where persuasion 
ends and manipulation begins in the context of decision-
making and informed consent. 
It is important to note that such manipulation creates a 
constitutionally-defined undue burden even if it does not 
actually affect the outcome of a woman’s decision.293 Although 
people making a decision during a heightened emotional state 
may make choices they otherwise would not,294 some emotional 
manipulation does not have the desired effect. Accordingly, 
some women continue to choose abortion.295 Nonetheless, just 
as the Court in Casey declared that untruthful, misleading 
and/or irrelevant information acts as an undue burden on a 
 
292. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 238, at 33. 
293. Cf. Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 44 (“If this emotional reaction 
were actually impossible for the patient to resist as she attempts to decide, it 
would cause her to fail the condition of noncontrol necessary for autonomous 
action. This is because an individual who acts in accord with an emotion that 
is irresistible does not make a choice at all. Unlike being rationally persuaded 
of prudential or moral considerations, an irresistible emotion unavoidably 
compels an action and prevents the exercise of autonomy.”). We argue above 
that attempted manipulation is all that is needed to pose an undue burden 
and this extra finding—that the emotional reaction is irresistible—is not 
necessary to prove the unconstitutionality of potentially manipulative 
information, even if it is necessary to show that the information actually did 
manipulate an individual’s decision in any particular case. See supra Part 
IV.C. 
294. See Blumenthal, supra note 239, at 4-5, 25-26 (discussing how 
truthful and non-misleading information that preys on the emotional 
vulnerabilities of a woman seeking an abortion can limit her autonomy); 
Sanger, supra note 231, at 396-97 (describing the sonogram requirement as 
an attempt to overpower reason rather than appeal to it); Sawicki, supra note 
238, at 16-17. 
295. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 351-52 (citing studies in British 
Columba and Alabama determining that women who chose to view a 
sonogram prior to abortion thereafter decided not to abort their fetus in a few 
cases); Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 30 & n.149. 
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woman’s right to choose by unduly interfering with the 
decision-making process itself regardless of any showing that 
the information actually affected a woman’s eventual decision, 
so information that manipulates a woman’s decision is an 
undue burden regardless of outcome.296 
 
D. Other Substantial Obstacles Posed by the Texas Sonogram 
Act 
 
Other aspects of the Texas Sonogram Act constitute a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions in 
Texas. In Casey, the Court recognized that “[t]he proper focus 
of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a 
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”297 
Here, the relevant group is the women who would not 
otherwise have chosen to have this procedure or hear this 
information. The question, therefore, is whether the Texas 
Sonogram Act places a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
large fraction of that relevant group of women. One important 
aspect of this law, as it is written, is that it may require 
transvaginal ultrasounds to be performed in a large proportion 
of cases.298 Although some commentators have argued that 
ultrasounds are non-invasive procedures,299 this is not the case 
when performed transvaginally. This procedure is not only 
invasive, but it is invasive in a way that can only be described 
as demeaning. To force a woman to remain still while a probe is 
inserted into her vagina against her will is to require a 
procedure that is tantamount to rape. If forcing women to 
submit to forced vaginal probes against their will is not a 
substantial obstacle, it is quite difficult to imagine anything 
short of an absolute bar to choice qualifying as a substantial 
obstacle. Yet, Casey clearly did not set so high a bar.300 To 
 
296. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 352 (“[G]oing ahead with the 
abortion [after viewing a sonogram] shows that the requirement did not 
constitute an obstacle, but it does not show that the woman was not burdened 
by it.”). 
297. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992). 
298. See supra Part I; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
299. See, e.g., Roseberry, supra note 30, at 399. 
300. See supra Part II.B. 
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require a woman to undergo such a personal violation in the 
absence of any clear medical benefit301 places a substantial 
obstacle in her path of choice. 
Many commentators have described the other aspects of 
this law that place a substantial obstacle in the path of women 
seeking abortions in Texas. Since these arguments have been 
made convincingly and extensively elsewhere, the main points 
are only briefly summarized below. 
First, the Texas Sonogram Act denies women their 
constitutionally protected right to refuse treatment for reasons 
that fit none of the usual circumscribed exceptions.302 Is an 
obstacle that requires women to waive one of their basic 
constitutional rights before they may have an abortion an 
undue burden then? It certainly seems reasonable to conclude 
that this could be so interpreted by the Court. 
Second, by requiring all women to have an ultrasound, the 
Texas Sonogram Act is likely to increase the costs associated 
with having abortions. As one analysis of Oklahoma’s abortion 
law examined, requiring an ultrasound in that state could 
increase costs of abortion “between forty-seven percent and 
seventy percent.”303 Such cost increase, if similarly exhibited in 
Texas, may constitute an undue burden under Casey. 
Third, some commentators believe that laws like this one 
could pose a substantial obstacle by creating psychological 
burdens for women forced to receive a sonogram and hear the 
information detailed therein against their will.304 The 
psychological burden could be created in either one of two 
ways. First, a woman forced to undergo a sonogram and hear it 
described may not change her mind regarding her decision to 
have an abortion, but she may experience more grief or 
psychological trauma as a result of that experience.305 Second, 
a woman who, in the midst of this heightened emotional state, 
chooses not to have an abortion and instead gives birth to a 
 
301. See supra Part IV.A. 
302. See Weber, supra note 30, at 368, 381. 
303. Id. at 371. 
304. See Roseberry, supra note 30, at 399-400; Weber, supra note 30, at 
382. 
305. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 352 (describing anecdotal evidence 
of potential emotional upset). 
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child for whom she is not in a good position to care also may 
also experience psychological trauma.306 The question is 
whether this kind of psychological trauma would rise to the 
level of creating a substantial obstacle in a large fraction of 
cases where women chose not to have or see the sonogram but 
were forced to anyway. Analyzing this type of argument would 
require empirical research, which may help to assess further 
the true psychological burdens that laws like this may cause 
women seeking abortions. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
There is much at stake when the Supreme Court next 
addresses abortion regulations. Casey’s constitutional 
requirements have been significantly misread by many. 
Although the joint opinion in Casey did recognize that 
protecting fetal life may be a permissible state interest, the 
protection of potential life cannot be achieved through violation 
of a woman’s right to make an informed decision. Thus, the 
joint opinion in Casey clearly set the requirement that no 
regulation prior to viability may unduly interfere with a 
woman’s decision-making process. The Justices who comprised 
the majority in Gonzales missed this crucial element of Casey 
and therefore failed to protect women’s full constitutional 
rights. 
This Article has implications for many state abortion 
regulations in addition to the Texas Sonogram Act. The 
arguments herein may be used to show that any state law that 
forces women to have medically unnecessary sonograms prior 
to abortion is unconstitutional regardless of whether such law 
requires that medical practitioners describe the images to the 
patient. In addition, this Article provides ammunition to those 
seeking to invalidate state regulations that require the delivery 
of inaccurate information to women seeking abortion. Lastly, 
and more generally, this Article shows why it is 
 
306. See Weber, supra note 30, at 369-71, 382 (discussing the argument 
that women being manipulated to carry to term may have psychological 
trauma). This psychological trauma challenges proponents’ claims that such 
abortion regulations serve the purpose of protecting women’s health. 
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unconstitutional to allow any kind of state regulation of 
abortion that purports to protect women from themselves in 
terms of their decision-making processes. 
The joint opinion in Casey acknowledged that women are 
equal citizens entitled to the same liberties of thought, choice, 
and action as other members of society. It also protected 
women’s rights to make reproductive decisions by declaring 
unconstitutional not only those state regulations that have the 
purpose or effect of barring women from choosing an abortion 
but also those regulations that manipulate women’s decision-
making processes, even if manipulation is justified as being in 
a woman’s best interest. Forty years after Roe first declared 
abortion to be a fundamental right, courts must uphold that 
promise and recognize that women’s liberty requires the right 
to make an informed choice, free from regulations that treat 
women as less than full persons under law. 
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